68 Am. U. L. Rev. 1053 (2019).

* Junior Staff Member, American University Law Review, Volume 68; J.D. Candidate, May 2021, American University Washington College of Law; B.A., Political Science, 2011, The University of Arizona.  I would like to thank my faculty advisor, Professor Anita Sinha, for sharing her guidance and expertise, and the Law Revieweditorial board for their support and thorough feedback throughout the production process.  I am particularly grateful for the assistance of my Note & Comment Editor, Susey Davis, Executive Editor, Cecilia Diedrich, and Associate Managing Editor, Tara Carrier.  Thanks also to my colleagues, Mary Greer, Jordan Long, and Bob Lang, for taking the time to help me brainstorm ideas during the early stages of the writing process. Additionally, I would like to thank my father, Allan Taylor, himself an accomplished attorney, for his invaluable feedback, mentorship, love, and support.  Finally, I owe a special debt of gratitude to my good friend and colleague, Sophia Gregg, and her colleague, Jason Yarashes, both from Legal Aid Justice Center, whose creative lawyering provided the inspiration for this piece.

Authority to enforce federal immigration policy in the United States is a power traditionally left exclusively to federal government agents.  However, § 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides a legal framework for state and local law enforcement to carry out federal immigration policy by entering a written agreement with the federal government.  These partnerships, widely known as “287(g) agreements,” are currently in place in seventy-eight jurisdictions nationwide, of which seventy-one are between a local sheriff’s office and the Department of Homeland Security. 

This Comment argues that Dillon’s Rule, a doctrine which limits the authority of cities, towns, and other localities to act unilaterally without authorization from the state legislature, creates a barrier to the enforcement of the 287(g) agreements currently in place between sheriffs’ offices and the federal government.  Specifically, Dillon’s Rule precludes sheriffs from entering 287(g) agreements without authorization from the state legislature, rendering these agreements invalid in most cases.  Accordingly, when an individual is detained or otherwise deprived of liberty or due process under an invalid 287(g) agreement, constitutional protections should apply.