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Volume 61, Issue 1
Padilla v. Kentucky: A New Chapter in Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Whether Deportation Constitutes Punishment for Lawful Permanent Residents?

By Anita Maddali | 61 Am. U. L. Rev. 1 (2011)

In this Article, I argue that the deportation of lawful permanent residents on account of a criminal conviction is punitive, and therefore enhanced constitutional protections must be afforded to lawful permanent residents during removal proceedings.  To support this argument I rely, in part, on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Padilla v. Kentucky.  The Padilla Court held that counsel must inform a client when a plea carries the risk of deportation.  The Court's analysis throughout the decision is groundbreaking in its recognition of the modern day realities of deportationspecifically the growing relationship between the immigration and criminal justice systems and the ways in which criminal convictions and deportation have become enmeshed over the years.

Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: Reconciling Brown v. Gardner's Presumption That Interpretive Doubt Be Resolved in Veterans' Favor with Chevron

By Linda Jellum | 61 Am. U. L. Rev. 59 (2011)

In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the United States Supreme Court held that agencies should determine the meaning of ambiguous statutes. But in the veterans law case Brown v. Gardner, the Supreme Court directed lower courts to resolve interpretive doubt in ambiguous statutes in favor of veterans. Which interpretation controls when a statute is ambiguous—the agency’s reasonable interpretation or the veteran’s interpretation? To date, none of the courts faced with this conflict have resolved this question clearly or definitively; indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims recently asked the Supreme Court for guidance. To date, none has been forthcoming.

COMMENT: Disrobing Judicial Campaign Contributions: A Case for Using the Buckley Framework to Analyze the Constitutionality of Judicial Solicitation Bans

By Aimee Priya Ghosh | 61 Am. U. L. Rev. 125 (2011)

In the past twenty years, numerous elected judges (and judicial candidates) have argued that state regulations prohibiting them from personally soliciting campaign contributions—even from would be litigants—violate their First Amendment free speech rights and should be struck down.  The constitutionality of these bans hedges on the level of scrutiny used for review. The bans should not be subject to strict scrutiny, but rather, the less rigorous campaign finance framework set out by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo.

COMMENT: Out of the Strike Zone: Why Graham v. Florida Makes It Unconstitutional to Use Juvenile-Age Convictions as Strikes to Mandate Life Without Parole Under § 841(b)(1)(A)

By Christopher J. Walsh | 61 Am. U. L. Rev. 165 (2011)

Life without parole is an incredibly harsh sentence. Recognizing this fact, the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Graham v. Florida held that life without parole is an unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment for any juvenile convicted of a nonhomicide crime. This Comment takes the rule from Graham v. Florida and applies it to another context: sentencing defendants who have been convicted of drug trafficking in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841.

NOTE: Putting the "Convenience" Back in Forum Non Conveniens: Gonzalez v. Advanced Medical Optics, Inc.

By Lindsay Cronin | 61 Am. U. L. Rev. 205 (2011)

Click here to read this Note.